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Outline
• X-planes introduction
• Recent (30 years) of structures related X-planes and 
research aircraft
• ARMD New Aviation Horizons Plan
• Structures lessons learned (four of many)
• Summary
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• 70 years of X-planes (Bell X-1 First flight – 19 Jan 1946)
• Original designation – “XS” for eXperimental Supersonic
• “X” identifies research craft designed for experimental and 
developmental research programs which are not intended for 
production beyond a limited number built solely for flight research
X-Plane Designation
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“Recent” Research Aircraft
• Flight research just not with X-planes
• Research aircraft include purpose-built aircraft without an “X” 
designation and aircraft (significantly) modified for specific research
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• 2014 → 2034 (est) Global Aviation Industry
 3.3B → 7B Passenger Trips; 58M → 105M Jobs; $2.4T → $6T GDP
• ARMD 10 Year X-Plane Plan
 Research/Demonstrate new airframe and propulsion technologies
 Distributed ~$4.25B budget increase over next 10 years
• Ultra-Efficient Subsonic Transports (UEST)
• Supersonic Low Boom Flight Demonstration
 Demonstrate boom noise reduction
 Support international regulation changes
• Hybrid Electric Propulsion
 Integration and demonstration
ARMD New Aviation Horizons Plan 
D-8:  Prop/AF integration 
enables reduced drag
HWB:  Aerodynamically efficient 
shape enables reduced drag
TBW:  Very high AR substantially 
increases wing efficiency
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New Aviation Horizons Flight Demo Plan 
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Validated ability for U.S. Industry to Build 
Transformative Aircraft that use 50% less 
energy and produce over 40dB 
(cumulative) less noise
Validated HEP Concepts, Technologies 
And Integration for U.S. Industry to Lead 
the Clean Propulsion Revolution
Enables Low Boom Regulatory Standard 
and validated ability for industry to 
produce and operate commercial low 
noise supersonic aircraft
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• Executing fwd → Remembering the past to succeed in the future
• Lessons learned from programmatic to technical
Structures Lessons Learned
Nov 2008
Aug 1953
X-3 (center), and clockwise from left: 
X-1A, D-558-I, XF-92A, X-5, D-558-II, and X-4
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• Changes perspective on technical risk →Take it! (more on that later)
• Changes perspective on “failure” → “Fail early, fail often.”
• Changes perspective on scope → Limited vs. Complete
• Changes perspective on expected results → Data is key
• “Learn by doing” → Build, fly, learn…  
“We will ask big questions, seek multi-disciplinary solutions, and demonstrate 
their feasibility in 18-36 months” – ARMD AA
Flight Research DT&E
Purpose
Discover something new or 
validate a theoretical principle
Verify and validate proper 
operation in flight environment 
to show works as designed
Predicted 
outcomes
Typically high uncertainty Typically high confidence
Measure 
of Success
Quality of data produced
Match predictions and validate 
operation
Flight-Research vs. Developmental T&E
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• Programmatic Risk
 Unacceptable to fail due to inadequate planning, management, etc.
• Technical Risk
 Technical failure is OK
 Can learn as much from technical failure as technical success
 Lean forward and accept risk of failing to meet the technical objectives
 Take the right technical risk
 Example:  First X-56 flex-wing flight takeoff mishap → Accepted risk of 
mishap due to flutter, but not takeoff mishap
• Safety Risk
 Edwards AFB, street names, conference 
room names, etc.
 Hazards must be identified, mitigation 
implemented, and risk assessed and 
accepted
• Misconception of taking risk in 
Convergent Aeronautics 
Solutions (CAS)
Take the Right Kind of Risk
Judson Brohmer
Tues, 17 July 2001, 0700
F-16
Capt Glenn Edwards
Sat, 5 June 1948, AM
YB-49
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• NASA granted authority to conduct airworthiness and safety review 
processes for “Public Use” aircraft outside of FAA regulations
• NPR7900.3C (Aircraft Operations Management Manual)
 2.3.2 Center Directors shall establish airworthiness, flight safety, mission 
readiness, and configuration control review processes and procedures to 
identify any hazards, to manage the risks associated with flight programs, to 
ensure safe flight operations, to manage and thoroughly document aircraft 
configurations, and to ensure that flight objectives satisfy programmatic 
requirements.
• Airworthiness = Capability of an aircraft to be operated within a 
prescribed flight envelope in accord with the project’s safety risk 
posture
Understand Airworthiness
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• Big picture:  Understand loads / Understand strength
• To support the airworthiness process, Structures Engineers gather 
airworthiness evidence through analysis and ground/flight-test to 
increase airworthiness confidence in accord with a project’s safety 
risk posture
• X-planes and research aircraft are not normally “certified” 
operational systems (either FAA or DoD)
 Airworthiness guidelines are tailored to meet mission requirements
 Multiple paths to airworthiness
 Can accept higher risk (in many cases the higher risk is mitigated through 
shorter life, more inspections, instrumentation, ground test, etc.) 
 Can trade envelope for margin
 Can trade real-time monitoring for margin
 Can disregard (in many cases) fatigue concerns
 Example:
Quiet SuperSonic Convergent Electric Propulsion 
Technology (QueSST) vs Scalable Technology and 
Aircraft (LBFD) Operations Research (SCEPTOR)
Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
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Considerations
 Design FS
 Confidence in 
external, internal, 
and thermal loads 
analysis
 Instrumentation ?
 Ground/flight testing
 Structural inspections 
(type & intervals)
 Flight envelope 
limitations
 Flight environment 
limitations
 Control law tailoring
 Fatigue 
considerations 
(usually of little 
concern)
Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
Ref:  G-7123.1-001B2 (Aircraft Structural Safety of Flight Guidelines)
Armstrong Flight Research Center 14
Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
– Mil-A-8860 Approach
– Utilized for a “certified” airframe
– Design to 1.5 FS (Ultimate = 1.5 x Design)
– Dedicated (sacrificial) static test article to 150% LL
– Fully instrumented and calibrated flight-test 
aircraft
– Methodical envelop expansion to 80% LL (loads 
survey) then to 100% LL (demonstration) [modern = 
gather data to correlate a model to clear an 
envelope]
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
Armstrong Flight Research Center 16
Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
– Design to 2.25 FS 
(Ultimate = 2.25 x Design)
– No proof test
– No loads instrumentation
– Conservative load predictions
– Fly to 100% LL
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
AFTI/F-11 Mission Adaptive Wing (MAW)
Variable camber LE & TE
AFTI/F-16XL2 Supersonic Laminar
Flow Control 
Glove and Attachments
F-106/C-141 Tow Launch Demonstration
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
– Design to 1.5 FS 
(Ultimate = 1.5 x 
Design)
– Low confidence in 
loads
– Fully instrumented and 
calibrated flight-test 
aircraft
– Flight-test aircraft is 
proof test aircraft
– Proof test to 100% LL
– Fly to 80% LL (100% 
LL on a case-by-case 
basis)
1.875
1.25
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
F-8 Supercritical Wing
Research Aircraft
X-29 Advanced
Technology Demonstrator
Scalable Convergent Electric 
Propulsion Technology and 
Operations Research (SCEPTOR)
Quiet SuperSonic Technology (QueSST)
Low Boom Flight Demonstrator (LBFD)
D-8 UEST
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
– Design to 1.5 FS 
(Ultimate = 1.5 x Design)
– Material prop knock down = 10%
– Extensive strain measurements
– Pre-mod baseline flight survey for 
FEM correlation
– Real-time monitoring of modified 
aircraft during methodical envelope 
expansion program to 100% LL
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA)
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
– Design to 1.8 FS 
(Ultimate = 1.8 x Design)
– Flight article proof tested to 1.2 DLL with post-test 
inspections
– Well understood, conservative load predictions
– No loads instrumentation
– Fly to 100% LL
1.8
1.2
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Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
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• A Word About Composites…
• Difficulty of Composites
 Mechanical performance VERY dependent upon Materials and Processes 
(M&P)
 Variance of material properties
 Requires characterization of material properties and structural features
• AFRC Aerostructures Philosophy
 Airworthiness requires a close link between design, analysis, and 
manufacturing (including material perf) to understand “as built” performance
 Relationship easier to establish when working with high pedigree OEMs
o Proven processes and ability to leverage design databases
 Employ a “building block approach” appropriately scoped for prototype flight
 Many paths to airworthiness → Tailorable based on risk posture, M&P, etc.
Understand Airworthiness (Cont)
Armstrong Flight Research Center 25
• X-planes/Research aircraft have unique requirements
 Unique research
 Unique mission
 Unique flight envelope
 Unique airframe and systems
• Design and airworthiness methodology should be tailored to meet 
unique research/mission requirements
 Not held to Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), Joint Service Specification 
Guides (JSSG), etc.
• Structures design and airworthiness methodology needs to be 
technically adequate (not technically meticulous) to meet the 
experiment’s intent in accord with the project’s safety risk posture 
• Example
 SCEPTOR – An electric-aero-propulsion integration experiment; Expected 
flight time of 30 min within EDW restricted area with EDW lakebed as landing 
mitigation
 QueSST – Expected flight time of 90-120 min over multiple CONUS metro 
areas including ferry to those locations (ferry OCONUS???)
Understand the Requirements
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• “Everyone” thinks Developmental Flight Instrumentation (DFI) is 
important
• “Everyone” wants DFI (Eng/Res always want more data)
• Projects need DFI (Eng/Res need some data)
• However …
 Instrumentation development is often a project’s afterthought and/or the last 
thing identified in the budget
 Projects often want the minimum amount of DFI thus limiting understanding 
of nominal and off-nominal events
 Projects want other projects to pay for their DFI development → Bad 
assumption that someone else is developing what you need
 Projects often only want COTS DFI, but right DFI for the project’s application 
does not exist (because no one paid for it to be on the shelf & ready to use)
• Early involvement integral to experiment success
 DFI can be long-lead procurement item
 Design in structurally imbedded DFI
 DFI development time/effort needed (sensors and packaging)
o Example:  Hypersonics – High temp sensors for flight → New sensor, minimum 
form factor, minimum weight, severe environment
Have the Ability to Learn the Right Info
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• Lucky or Good?
 Structural DFI needed to understand performance impacting experiment
o Example:  QueSST/LBFD – Primary experiment boom reduction/characterization 
→ Need to understand airframe deflection to understand impact on boom → 
FOSS deflection and twist determination → Roadmap developed to meet project 
requirement while leveraging other efforts
 Structural DFI needed to understand performance in event of mishap
o Example:  Hypersonics experiments where additional info would have been 
helpful in understanding event
• Purposed and opportune → Need big picture view to develop meas
and test technology/techniques as a priority for future NASA efforts
Learn the Right Info (Cont)
Strain gage loads measurement techniques
on composites proven on HiMAT
then utilized on X-29
Electro-optical Flight Deflection Measurement
System (FDMS) developed for HiMAT then utilized
on AFTI/F-111 MAW, X-29, and X-53 AAW
Highly Maneuverable
Aircraft Technology 
(HiMAT)
F-111 MAW
X-53 AAW
X-29
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• Proposed budgets and research acknowledges need for USA to lead 
in aeronautics research – for nation and world
• If proposed budgets become reality → Very exciting time for NASA 
to significantly impact our nation’s economy for years to come
• Lessons Learned 
#1 – Understand the uniqueness of flight research vs. DT&E
#2 – Understand risk; Take technical risk; Do not compromise on 
safety risk
#3 – Understand tailorable/adequate airworthiness processes 
applicable to aeronautics research 
#4 – Make sure you have the ability to learn the right information 
from the research; Work DFI development early
Summary
